via Macro_Untold
Everyone talks about the “coming” crash, but if you look at the actual transaction logs from the last 6 months, the crash isn’t coming—it’s already here, and it’s being hidden by “Extend and Pretend” accounting.
I’ve been digging into the specific numbers on the Blackstone 1740 Broadway default in NYC, and the math is terrifying for anyone holding pension funds or insurance policies.
The Crime Scene:
* 2014: Blackstone buys the tower for $605M.
* The Financing: They wrapped it into a CMBS (Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security). The AAA-rated tranche (the “safe” part) was sold to pension funds and insurers.
* The Crash: LBrands leaves. Blackstone defaults. The building was just sold/valued around $186M.
* The Result: A ~69% wipeout on a Manhattan trophy asset.
Here is the scary part (The “AAA” Lie): In 2008, subprime was the issue. Today, it’s supposed to be “contained.” But in this specific deal, the losses were so deep they burned through the lower bonds and actually hit the AAA holders with a ~26% principal loss.
This hasn’t happened to a AAA conduit CMBS since the GFC.
It’s not just NYC. Look at the data points from Q2/Q3:
* St. Louis (909 Chestnut): Sold for $205M (2006) -> Sold for $3.6M (2024). That is a 98.2% drop. The land is worth more than the building.
* Los Angeles (Aon Center): $268M -> $147M (~45% drop).
* The “Hope Note” Strategy: Banks are splitting loans into “A-notes” (performing) and “B-notes” (dead/ignored) just to avoid marking the loss on their books.
The Fed/FDIC guidance from June 2023 basically gave banks permission to “work it out” (aka hide the losses) rather than foreclose. But with $900B+ in loans maturing, the math doesn’t work at 7-9% refinancing rates.
My Take: The only reason we aren’t seeing bank failures daily right now is because they are legally allowed to pretend these buildings are still worth 2019 prices.
Has anyone else been tracking the “B-Note” restructuring data? It feels like 2008 all over again, but this time the collateral is empty offices instead of strippers with 5 mortgages.