The U.S. Secret Service (USSS), established as a personal bodyguard for U.S. presidents, is playing an increasingly dangerous role in U.S. politics. Assassination attempts on the life of former president Donald Trump, by Ryan Routh on September 18 and Thomas Crooks at Butler, Pennsylvania, raise the disturbing possibility of designed convergences of security lapses that give assassins the opportunity to kill.
Trump’s protective detail was purposefully stretched thin
Details are still missing regarding Routh’s attempt, but he apparently camped out for approximately 12 hours waiting for Trump to appear at hole 6 of the Trump International Golf Club. Trump was headed that way, teeing off at hole 5 when a Secret Service agent saw a rifle sticking through some shrubbery and flushed Routh out with a few shots. There was no prior sweep done of the golf course.
Newly consolidated details on Trump’s Butler rally reveal a more sophisticated plot. Jill Biden spontaneously decided to speak in Pittsburgh on July 13 at a small event, announced only a week prior. Kamala Harris similarly joined a small event in Philadelphia the same day, confirmed as a speaker on July 10. These last-minute additions to “The Schedule” diverted most of Trump’s regular protective detail and breached longstanding White House and USSS security protocols.
Trump’s tall, male USSS regulars were replaced by substantially shorter agents, many of whom were women, borrowed from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and whose training consisted of only a two-hour webinar. One of these women cowered behind Trump as he was shot at by Crooks, positioned merely 130 yards away on the roof of building 6 (AGR 6) of the nearby AGR multi-building complex.
Butler security was a wreck. The usual canine teams were missing, improper people were accessing backstage areas, and DHS officials failed to properly patrol the podium area or the “secure perimeter” near the AGR complex, a mistake repeated at Trump’s golf course. Trump had been routinely denied security resources such as sniper teams and additional agents for the previous two years personally by USSS deputy director Ronald Rowe. Rowe became USSS acting director after Kimberly Cheatle’s resignation, becoming responsible for investigating the failed USSS security plan and response to the assassination attempt.
Rowe had personally made cuts to the Counter Surveillance Division (CSD), responsible for venue threat assessment. The CSD had not conducted an evaluation for the Butler rally or even been present the day of. Rowe personally retaliated against agents voicing security concerns leading up to Butler. One whistleblower stated: “If personnel from CSD had been present at the rally, the gunman would have been handcuffed in the parking lot after being spotted with a rangefinder.”
Local resources were similarly stretched. Police were consumed with traffic duty and told USSS they were unable even to station a patrol car in front of the AGR complex. Only three local snipers from the Butler and Beaver County Emergency Services Units (ESU) were assigned to the entire AGR complex, guarding from the second-story window in AGR 7, and one had to leave before the rally.
www.americanthinker.com/articles/2024/09/lots_of_coincidences_in_trump_assassination_attempts.html